Task, team and technology integration in the paediatric cardiac operating room
Introduction
It is now over a decade since the recognition that inherent failures in healthcare systems predisposes to surgical errors that could have an observable impact on patient outcomes in paediatric cardiac surgery [1]. About the same time, studies examining the level of accidental harm in healthcare – the quality “chasm” – sparked a much wider interest in the relationship between harm, systems of care, and individual human performance [2], [3]. As the decade has progressed, this has expanded the understanding of surgical accidents and how errors might be avoided. There is now a greater understanding within healthcare in general of how and why inadvertent injury occurs [4], [5], [6], and of the “systems” approach to safety and quality improvement [7], [8]. One of the most dominant and potentially valuable paradigms for improving safety in surgery is through a set of collective knowledge and techniques derived from scientific management and industrial psychology, known as human factors [9].
Human Factors is the scientific discipline and application of methods to improve the relationship between humans and other parts of a system [10]. It is based on the premise that humans are difficult to change, shaped as they are by genetics and evolution, while systems are more flexibly altered. It is therefore systems that are deficient, unreliable, unsafe, and predispose to human error by matching badly with human abilities and limitations [11]. The aim is to optimise human abilities to achieve better performance, safety, health, satisfaction and overall system performance by configuring a working environment around a well established understanding of human traits and variability.
Patient safety and human factors research has increasingly suggested that within Hospitals in general, operating theatres in particular, and especially paediatric cardiac surgery (PCS), there is a huge capacity for things to go wrong [12]. There is a reliance on individual healthcare practitioners to perform to a high degree of precision both with the individual aspects of care delivery [13], [14] and at a higher order decision making and planning level for the care of the patient [15]. The design, maintenance and availability of equipment are poor [16], and training often omits interpersonal and non technical, cognitive skills that are nonetheless important for successful surgery [17]. Even though a great many process problems, disruptions, and potential adverse events are identified and addressed before they affect the patient, they can still contribute to undesirable outcomes [18].
In this paper two components of the operative process are presented that illustrate the complex interactions between team, task and technology in paediatric cardiac surgery. By doing so, we hope to examine how human performance and outcomes in the OR might be better understood and improved in the future.
Section snippets
Methods
The observations of PCS teams occurred during examination of 24 paediatric cardiac (which were also video recorded) and 6 adult CABG at two UK medical centres [19], [20]. Previous work has described quantitative measures that describe a science of safety and quality improvement in PCS. These observations began with handwritten notes on intraoperative events, from which it was possible to identify minor process problems or deviations, classify them and then count them across a number of
A perspective on task, team and process in paediatric cardiac surgery
All surgical procedures require close co-ordination between a number of individuals. The Attending Surgeon is usually seen as the leader of an operating team while the assistant/resident surgeons and scrub nurse support and follow the lead of the surgeon. The circulating nurse supports the scrub nurse and other team members if needed. The anaesthesiologist keeps the patient stable while the surgeon performs the operation, and also needs to apply their own leadership skill and expertise, which
Case study 1: Heparin protocols
Administering appropriate anti-coagulation medication is required to avoid embolism and is critical when patients are supported by cardio-pulmonary bypass support. Failure to do so while on CPB has an incidence of approximately 1 in 750 cases [23], and is a well recognised complication. Table 1 illustrates two approaches that have been observed in two different hospitals in the application of Heparin in cardiac surgery. The method adopted by hospital A is considerably safer than in hospital B
Case study 2: a modified ultra-filtration error
The complexity of task, team and technology in cardiopulmonary perfusion is illustrated in Fig. 2, which presents a transcript of a communication error during Modified Ultrafiltration (MUF) that led to mild exsanguinations before being identified and addressed. Prior to the mis-communication itself (at 13:39) it is clear that the period, during and immediately following cardio-pulmonary bypass, is of particularly high workload, especially when it follows a high risk or complex set of surgical
Discussion
These case studies illustrate the complexity of teamwork and the PCS process in the OR. By examining where and how risks can occur, often unseen by the operating teams, within the systems of work in surgery, they provide a “window on the system” [25] which allows us to generate hypotheses about the nature and interconnectedness of process, teamwork and safety in the PCS OR. The maintenance of perfusion in a cardiac case requires tight coupling of surgical process, equipment and teamwork [26].
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Marc de Leval, Tony Giddings, Guy Hirst, Trevor Dale and Jane Carthey for their various support in researching this paper. No conflicts of interest are declared.
This article was supported through independent research commissioned by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) under its Programme Grants for Applied Research scheme (RP-PG-0108-10020). The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR
References (29)
- et al.
A prospective observational study of human factors, adverse events, and patient outcomes in surgery for pediatric cardiac disease
J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg
(2008) - et al.
Human factors and cardiac surgery: a multicenter study
J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg
(2000) - et al.
Improving patient safety by identifying latent failures in successful operations
Surgery
(2007) Learning from Bristol: the report of the public inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984–1995
(2001)- et al.
To err is human: building a safer health system
(2000) An organisation with a memory: report of an expert group on learning from adverse events in the NHS
(2000)- et al.
The incidence and nature of in-hospital adverse events: a systematic review
Qual Saf Health Care
(2008) - et al.
Extent, nature and consequences of adverse events: results of a retrospective casenote review in a large NHS hospital
Qual Saf Health Care
(2007) - et al.
Systems approaches to surgical quality and safety: from concept to measurement
Ann Surg
(2004) - et al.
A critical look at Lean Thinking in healthcare
Qual Saf Health Care
(2008)
Patient safety and human factors in pediatric cardiac surgery
Pediatr Cardiol
Work system design for patient safety: the SEIPS model
Qual Saf Health Care
The field guide to human error investigations
Identification of systems failures in successful pediatric cardiac surgery
Ergonomics
Cited by (23)
The role of human factors in neonatal patient safety
2019, Seminars in PerinatologyCitation Excerpt :For example, the management of perfusion during cardiopulmonary bypass is critical during congenital heart surgery and requires the careful balance of surgical procedural requirements and patient needs through constant communication between surgeon, anesthesiologist and perfusionist, all of whom share a complex set of interrelated tasks utilizing multiple technologies. One small error in one of these components – a missed communication, a malfunctioning device, or an omitted task – can lead to a major deviation that threatens the success of the surgery.45 It also applied these principles to other surgical specialties, finding that while the general models applied, small failures in less complex surgeries are less likely to create increases in risk.46
Human factors in robotic assisted surgery: Lessons from studies ‘in the Wild’
2019, Applied ErgonomicsCitation Excerpt :However, the nature of those disruptions – and, conversely, the nature of successful teamwork – varies vastly across different specialties. For example, on-pump cardiac surgery requires constant interactive communications between surgeon, anesthesiologist, and perfusionist (Catchpole, 2011), while laparoscopic cholecystectomy requires particular interactions between surgeon and assistant regarding the use and position of the camera. In robotic surgery, the surgeon is no longer at the operating table, so cannot see precisely what is happening at the operating table, nor can the team always hear.
Important Non-Technical Skills in Video-Assisted Thoracoscopic Surgery Lobectomy: Team Perspectives
2017, Annals of Thoracic SurgerySurgical Team Mapping: Implications for Staff Allocation and Coordination
2015, AORN JournalCitation Excerpt :The RN circulator supports the scrub person and other team members as needed while the anesthesia professional anesthetizes or sedates the patient and maintains his or her stability during surgery. Clearly, surgical teams are required to collaborate and coordinate their performance in a manner that ensures that the combined experience of all members is shared and optimized.19 For ideal performance, surgical teams need to be more than merely groups of individuals.
Barriers to trauma patient care associated with CT scanning
2013, Journal of the American College of SurgeonsCitation Excerpt :These instances we identified using same-source classifications and by distinguishing high impact from low impact incidents. However, it is important to recognize that even seemingly small problems can concatenate in unexpected ways,16-19 and the team cannot (and should not) always be relied on to compensate.20 Indeed, high risk cases are potentially more affected by disruptions and may experience more because of the additional challenges they pose.21